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I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading involves the sale or purchase of securities while in 
(1) 
possession of material, non-public information. Since the establishment 
of the Chinese Securities Market in the 1990s, the number of insider 
(2) 
trading cases have steadily increased. From the 3-27 Debt Event in 
(3) 
1995 (the early stage) to the Hangxiao Steel Structure Case in 2007 
(4) 
(the mid-term) and the 8-16 Fat Finger Trading Error Event in 2013 
(the late term), the endless stream of insider trading cases has consistently 
triggered public concern regarding the regulation of insider trading. 
This was especially true in the 2015 Chinese stock market crash, which 
provoked profound reflection regarding many troublesome problems 
related to the supervision of the securities market, including the 
clarification of securities insider trading subjects as the starting point 
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for an insider trading regulation system; indeed, these reflections 
highlighted how legislation had fallen behind practice in China, resulting 
(5) 
in a failure to effectively guide practice. 
Theoretically, whether or not we should prohibit insider trading is 
a controversial issue. Some scholars who object to the prohibition of 
such transactions believe that insider trading can help managers to 
obtain proper rewards and impetus and promote the conveyance of 
corporate information that enhances the efficiency of market-allocated 
resources. When insider trading is permitted, stock prices better reflect 
(6) 
information and will be higher on average. However, other scholars 
believe that allowing insider trading will make morally hazardous 
behavior alluring, increase adverse selections, further reduce the efficiency 
(7) 
of corporate government, and discourage investors . Insider trading 
undermines the fairness and integrity of the securities markets, which 
(8) 
leads to dysfunction of securities markets . Although conclusions in 
this regard are inconsistent, a study of the 103 countries that have 
stock markets reveals that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them, 
but enforcement-as evidenced by prosecutions-has taken place in only 
(9) 
38 of them. In other words, the prohibition of insider trading is the 
(10) 
mainstream practice that most counties, including Japan and China, 
have adopted. Inside trading is one of the major illegal financial frauds 
(11) 
throughout the development of Chinese securities market. China's attitude 
toward the regulation of trading is quite severe, showing zero tolerance 
(12) 
to insider trading. 
(13) 
Effective regulation is essential to the deterrence of insider trading. 
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With regard to regulations of insider trading, defining the subjects of 
insider trading has long been an important issue in China. For example, 
regarding the subjects of insider trading, Article 73 of the Securities 
Law of the People's Republic of China includes the following statements: 
(14) 
"the insiders who have access to insider information of securities trading," 
(15) 
"the insiders who have illegal obtainment of insider information." These 
expressions define the subjects of insider trading differently, creating 
both textual and logical contradictions that prevent the development 
of a clear definition of the scope of the insiders. Such inconsistent 
expressions in the regulatory system stem from different theoretical 
bases - theories that can be found in American law. More specifically, 
some courts have held that, regarding the scope of the subjects, 
regulators should adopt the theory of fiduciary duty as a legal 
foundation meaning only people who bear a fiduciary duty would qualify 
(16) 
as subjects. Others advocate for expanding the definition of the subjects 
07) 
of insider trading by applying the misappropriation theory. Still others 
suggest that regulators should adopt the equal access theory as the 
(18) 
legal bedrock for insider trading regulation. The proponents of each 
of these theories can point to relevant judicial cases to support their 
views. The problem of the definition of the subjects of insider trading 
in China would evidently be even more complex in a multi-level regulation 
system that relied more on administrative means. Consequently, this 
article relies on these theoretical views to analyze the scope, categorization, 
and confirmation of subjects of insider trading in China. 
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This article holds the following viewpoints. Because of complex and 
diverse insider trading subjects in China and longstanding logical 
contradictions in related legislation, China should adopt the equal access 
theory to improve its Securities Law. According to this theory, insider 
trading occurs when subjects clearly know that the information concerned 
is confidential and still make illegal use of it to engage in securities 
trading. Meanwhile, the subjects of insider trading can be divided into 
three categories: corporate insiders, temporary insiders, and tippees. 
Because of the close relationship between inside information and insiders, 
subject-related statutes still need to be considered after identifying the 
individuals involved in insider trading. Therefore, this article is organized 
into five parts to explain these points in more detail. Part II analyzes 
the scope of insider trading subjects in China from normative and 
practical perspectives. Part III outlines the theoretical foundation for 
the scope of insider trading subjects and its legislative terms in China. 
Part IV examines more appropriate theories for Chinese regulations. 
Part V focuses on the categorization of insider trading subjects, and 
part VI concludes the article. 
II. THE DILEMMA OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION TO
PRACTICAL CASES
The evolution of legislation related to Chinese securities market can 
be divided into three stages: first, the period of establishment (1990-
1996); second, the period of development (1997-2008); and third, the period 
(19) 
of perfection (2009-Present). Some of the problems in the regulatory 
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system regarding the scope of insider trading subjects, including certain 
administrative rules and fundamental laws, require careful analysis. 
A. Different Expressions of the Subjects in the Chinese Legislation
System
This realistic dilemma actually reflects the fact that insider trading
has resulted in an institutional logic confusion, and constituted obstacles 
in terms of determining relevant transactions and ascertaining 
(20) 
liabilities. Article 180 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of 
China (1997 Revision), the first legal provision related to insider trading 
in basic law, established a specialized provision about the crime of insider 
trading: "People who have inside information on securities trading, 
illegally obtain inside information on securities trading, or buy or sell 
securities or leak relevant information prior to the release of information 
that could have a major effect on the issuance and trading of the 
securities concerned or on the price of other securities shall be sentenced 
to not more than five years in prison or criminal detention, provided 
(21) 
the circumstances are serious." This means that the law's insider trading 
regulations apply to "the people who are aware of the inside information 
concerning the securities and futures trading" and "the persons who 
illegally acquire inside information." Meanwhile, Article 73 of the 
Securities Law of the People's Republic of China (effective in July, 1999) 
defined the subjects forbidden from engaging in insider trading as "the 
people who are aware of the inside information concerning the securities 
and futures trading" and "the persons who illegally acquire inside 
(22) 
information. "  Although the Articles used by the two laws seem to 
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encompass all people who know and illegally acquire inside information, 
these Articles limit the scope by categorizing and listing a certain range 
of inside trading subjects including directors, supervisors, senior 
managers, and shareholders who hold more than 5% of a given company's 
shares. We know that regulations regarding insider trading subjects 
in China have not explicitly identified "any person," and these two 
Articles are generally interpreted as not applying to "any person." If 
they did, it would be unnecessary to enumerate the different categories 
(23) 
of insider trading subJect. However, a series of administrative rules 
promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
rather than the Securities Law, does use the "any person" designation 
for insider trading subjects. For example, Articles 4 and 66 of the 
Administrative Measures promulgated by the CSRC in 2007 include the 
(24) 
phrases "any insider" and "any institution and individual," which implies 
an intention to expand the definition to cover all people with inside 
(25) 
information. In other words, the CSRC holds that inside trading subjects 
are not limited to a certain set of individuals. These subjects are 
enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the CSRC No.1, and further divided 
(26) 
into five categories. Together, the five categories include any person 
who acquires inside information via any other means. This has expanded 
the definition of insider trading subjects to include "any person." In 
addition, Article 7 of the Measures (2016 Revision) stipulates that 
organizations and individuals must keep information on material asset 
reorganization that they have access to confidential before such 
information is disclosed in accordance with the law, and that organizations 
(27) 
and individuals are forbidden from taking part in insider dealing. 
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Judicial Interpretation Coded (2012) No. 6 arrived at a similar interpretation, 
identifying those individuals who are aware of inside information 
concerning securities and futures trading and those who illegally acquire 
said inside information as insider trading subjects. Sub-clause 3 of 
Article 2 places no limitations on the definition of the insider trading 
subject, indicating that anyone who knows inside information will likely 
(28) 
be considered an insider trading subject under this regulation. This 
interpretation also tends to expand the definition of insider trading 
subjects stipulated in Article 73 of the Securities Law. 
The above analysis reveals that the CSRC aimed to expand the 
definition of insider trading subjects from "people being aware of inside 
information" and "the persons who illegally acquire inside information" 
in Article 73 of the Securities Law to "any person" who knows inside 
information. However, the phrases in these administrative rules, as in 
the lower-level regulations, do not have the legal capacity to amend 
upper-level legislation and their application has no judicial effect. Even 
if the interpretations of both the Supreme People's Court and the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate have literally expanded the terms to 
cover "any person," we still do not know whether this is consistent 
with the real intention of China's national lawmakers. As a result, at 
the normative level, inconsistencies exist between the terms used in 
upper and lower level legislation in defining insider trading subjects, 
and the key dimension of this difference is the inclusion or lack thereof 
of "any person" in regulations concerning insider trading subjects. 
In addition, a logical contradiction exists between Article 73 and 
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Article 74 of the Securities Law. It is concluded through analysis of 
the two provisions that parallel relation, without occurring any 
subordinating and cross-referencing relation, are found between "the 
people who are aware of the inside information concerning the securities 
and futures trading" and "the persons who illegally acquire inside 
information", both of which are stated in Article 73 of the Securities 
(29) 
Law. Article 74 of the law concerns the term "insider," while Article 
(30) 
76 of the Securities Law and Article 180 of the Criminal Law concern 
the persons who illegally acquire inside information. Therefore, the two 
expressions are different and paratactic and do not include any cross­
references. However, in terms of the semantic logic or literal meaning, 
the "people who are aware of the inside information" includes those 
who illegally acquire inside information, which raises many questions, 
including: Why do lawmakers want to distinguish "people being aware 
of inside information" from "the persons who illegally acquire inside 
information"? What does the word "illegally" mean in this context? Is 
this word simply intended to emphasize unlawful means? In addition, 
how do we explain the reference to "the other persons as specified by 
CSRC," an authoritative provision contained in sub-clause 7 of Article 
74 of the Securities Law? Can this phrase be expanded to include any 
person? At one level, such an expression could be interpreted as indicating 
that when any concerned party falls into the categories listed in Article 
74, said party cannot use inside information to trade. At another level, 
however, the expression can be interpreted as indicating that when a 
concerned party knows inside information, but has not been included 
into the listed categories, said party cannot be prevented from using 
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such inside information to trade. In other words, the miscellaneous 
provision in Article 74 of the Securities Law can be interpreted as not 
including all individuals - any person - that are aware of the inside 
information as subjects excluded from insider trading. Alternatively, 
this clause arguably makes it possible to expand "other persons" to 
encompass "any person." The absence of any statutory document 
addressing these contradictory interpretations has resulted in different 
approaches in practice. 
B. Different Approaches to Expanding the Scope of the Subjects in
Practice
Courts or the procuratorate or the CSRC can take various approaches
to expanding the scope of insider trading subjects in practice. 
1 . Judicial Approach 
People v. Li and Two Other Persons. This case was published by the 
(31) 
Supreme People's Procuratorate in September 2015 . In this case, Li 
was a director and secretary of the board of directors of a listed 
company. The chairman of the board of the company and senior 
executives, including Li, held a meeting on June 23, 2012, in which 
they discussed the reorganization of the company's assets. After the 
meeting, the chairman asked Li to prepare some materials about the 
assets reorganization. Subsequently, the listed company applied to 
suspend its securities trading; the application was approved, and the 
period of temporary suspension extended from July 6, 2012 to November 
5, 2012. During this period, Li passed information about the assets 
reorganization to her husband Song and her cousin Tu. Song and Tu 
東北法学 第50号(2018) 45 
used the information to separately buy the company's stocks using 
another person's securities account on July 1 and July 2 and then sold 
all the aforesaid stocks on November 21, making a profit of 860,120.87 
yuan. 
I I Divulging the information of assets reorganizationD1rector L1 
I Her husband: Song I 
I Her cousin: Tu I 
In this case, since Li participated in the entire asset reorganization 
process as a director and secretary, she knew the inside information 
and deliberately conveyed it to her husband and cousin. Li's actions 
indisputably constituted the crime of inside trading. Meanwhile, Song 
and Tu, Li's husband and cousin, were not covered by the definition 
of insider trading subject in Article 74 of the Securities Law, but they 
fit within the scope of the expression "a close relative or any other 
person" in Article 2 of Judicial Interpretation Coded (2012) No. 6. Therefore, 
the court convicted all three persons of the crime of insider trading. 
However, convicting individuals who did not belong to the types covered 
by Article 74 of Securities Law of committing the crime of insider 
trading was not easy. Proving that Song and Tu's approach to acquiring 
the inside information was unlawful also proved difficult. Courts usually 
adopt the theory of joint offense to judge such cases. Such a situation 
occurred in the following classic case. 
(32) 
People v. Li and Other Persons. Tan was the president of a company. 
He told the local mayor, Li, about the company's restructuring and 
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listing plan. Li passed this message to his sister-in-law, Lin, and Lin 
used other people's accounts to purchase company stocks during the 
sensitive period, making a profit of 19830,000.00 yuan. In this case, 
although Li was a public servant, he did not have the power to 
administer the issuance and trading of securities. In other words, the 
subject definition in Article 74 of the Securities Law did not cover him. 
At the same time, although aforementioned rule includes "anyone" in 
its definition of insider trading subjects pursuant to the Administrative 
Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies, this 
case happened in 2007 and, according to the legal principle of non­
retroactivity, the rule could not be applied. Because Tan, as the president 
of the company, was a typical insider trading subject and because Li 
participated in the trading, the court ruled that Li and Tan had jointly 
committed the crime of insider trading. 
President Tan 
Reporting the work progress 
Mayor: Li j
↓ は:d:言：は;',,on
I His sister-in-law: Lin' 
2 . The CSRC's Approach 
Between January 2016 and September 2017, the CSRC formally 
investigated 117 cases. Among these cases, 30% involved statutory 
subjects who were aware of inside information and directly engaged in 
insider trading; the other 70% involved non-statutory subjects make up 
70%, including relatives, friends, classmates, business partners, and so 
(33) 
on. In other words, a certain relationship usually exists between "people 
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being aware of the inside information" and "the persons who illegally 
acquire inside information," such as consanguinity, fellowship, working 
relationships, and they often contact and divulge inside information to 
each other by sending messages, calling, dining together, or other 
similar activities. To regulate non-statutory insider trading subjects, 
the CSRC adopted an approach that expanded the definition of inside 
trading subjects in accordance with Articles 74 or 202 of the Securities 
Law. For example, the CSRC often treats the provision "any other 
person as prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the 
State Council" as the miscellaneous provisions of Article 74 of the 
Securities Law. Although the courts decide some inside trading cases, 
the CSRC handles most practical inside trading cases with administrative 
penalties. Several cases exemplify the CSRC's insider trading-related 
features. 
In CSRC Administrative Sanction Decision (on Kuang, Zhang, and 
(34) 
Xu), [2010) No.32, Kuang, the former secretary of the directorate, helped 
the Geli Company reorganize material assets at the behest of the Geli 
chairman. Zhang, Kuang's wife, overheard Kuang discussing inside 
information regarding the assets reorganization on their home phone. 
Zhang divulged and advised her nephew Xu to purchase the company's 
stocks, and Xu completed relevant inside trading and made a profit. 
The CSRC considered the three of them as insider trading subjects and 
issued correspondmg admm1strative sanctions. 
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I Kuang's wife: Zhang I�;:�:
s
::
r
!;:���:g��:a� ご
↓ Conveying the information
Her nephew: Xu I 
► I Former secretary of
directorate: Kuang
This case involved two difficult points. First, although Kuang previously 
work as manager and a secretary of the Geli company directorate, he 
was not an inside trading statutory subject as defined in Article 7 4 of 
Securities Law, he did not deliberately divulge the inside information, 
and he did not participate in the trading. Moreover, Zhang and Xu the 
scope of the definition of subjects in Article 74 of the Securities Law 
did not cover Zhang and Xu. However, the CSRC held that Zhang 
should have borne the duty of care and kept the information secret 
since he participated in the entire process of the company's assets 
reorganization. Zhang was so careless that he did not take necessary 
precautions when he discussed the business over the phone, enabling 
his wife to overhear the inside information. Therefore, according to 
Article 202 of Securities Law, all three parties were guilty of inside 
trading. 
The above analysis indicates that the courts and the CSRC have 
adopted different approaches to expand the definition of insider trading 
subjects. In certain judicial cases, the courts adopted the theory of 
joint offense; thus, this theory had a limited application since most 
inside trading cases do not involve judicial procedures. In addition, in 
practice, this approach does function effectively for more complex and 
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diverse inside trading subjects. The CRSC expanded the interpretation 
of "the people who are aware of the inside information" to meet practical 
demands, but this approach can easily go beyond the legal aims of the 
Securities Law and create selective enforcement, and it has received a 
great deal of criticism from certain scholars. For example, some claim 
that by investigating the tipper's liability in insider trading cases, the 
CRSC has adopted a strategy of selective enforcement, and this selective 
enforcement strategy may cause several problems include inconsistent 
legal logic of enforcement, motivating complicated insider trading 
(35) 
activities. Therefore, it is not difficult to get the tendency of expanding 
subjects of inside trading compared to confusion caused by legal 
provisions which inconsistent terms used between upper level legislation 
and lower level regulation. In fact, the forces that have perpetuated 
this situation can be traced back to a different theory regarding the 
regulation of insider trading. 
皿THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION FOR DIFFERENT 
SUBJECTS OF INSIDE TRADING 
Many countries refer to the rules of the United States (US) regarding 
the prohibition of insider trading as a legislative blueprint when 
formulating their insider trading laws and regulations. Section lO(b) 
of the US's Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942 are the two 
(36) 
sections most frequently mentioned in the US. 
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A. Fiduciary Duty Theory
Although the US established laws prohibiting insider trading in 1934,
securities insider trading cases appeared in the country as early as 
1891. Strong v. Repid, which dates to 1909, was a famous insider trading 
lawsuit during this early period the US. The fiduciary duty theory 
was the adopted during this case's judicial trial. The US Supreme Court 
held that although the company's directors were not obliged to disclose 
all company-related information related, for the company's important 
transactions (specific circumstances that might affect the company's 
stock price, such as corporate mergers or transfers of property), they 
(37) 
were obliged to do so. Subsequently, this theory was adopted in a 
majority of verdicts. In 1980, the US Federal Court adopted this theory 
in determining whether or not the plaintiff in Chiarella v. United 
(38) 
States Case was an insider trading subJect. In this case, the US Supreme 
Court required the existence of a fiduciary relationship as a predicate 
for liability. The Court held that "No duty could arise from petitioner's 
relationship with the sellers of the target company's securities, for 
petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, 
he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger 
(39) 
II who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions. 
In 1983, the US Supreme Court reiterated this rationale in Dirks v. 
SEC. The Court held: "We reaffirm today that a duty to disclose arises 
from the relationship between parties ・ ・ ・ ， and not merely from one's
(40) 
ability to acquire information because of his position in the market. 
The reapplication of this theory sustained the view that a fiduciary 
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duty exists between any two concerned parties, among which, one 
party is bound by the duty to disclose information - more specifically, 
to inform trading parties of relevant information to eliminate information 
asymmetry. In other words, an insider in possession of material 
nonpublic information must disclose such information before trading 
(41) 
or, if disclosure is impossible or improper, abstain from trading. In 
these precedent cases, the courts held that neither Chiarella nor Dirks 
were not obliged to disclose inside information or abstain from trading, 
and were therefore not guilty of insider trading. Furthermore, as the 
court's rulings pointed out, only if a fiduciary relationship exists can 
insiders be obliged to disclose information, and once the tippee acquires 
information from an insider, said tippee does not necessarily inherit 
the fiduciary duty from the insider, and only if both parties have jointly 
(42) 
violated the fiduciary duty does it constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5. 
As the above cases indicate, the fiduciary duty theory requires the 
existence of a specific identity relationship between the subject and the 
company, meaning the primary standard for identifying an insider is 
to see whether a fiduciary duty exists between the individual in question 
and the company. On this basis, we can divide insiders into two 
categories. First, there are traditional insiders, mainly including the 
directors, supervisors, and senior managers of issuers or those who 
have close relationships with the company due to contract control like 
actual controllers. The other category includes the temporary insiders, 
mainly those who have external relationships with the company, such 
as business, service, or even supervision, and hence acquire inside 
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information that enables them to engage in insider trading (e.g., lawy 
ers and accountants). However, the existence of both traditional and 
temporary insiders is predicated on the fiduciary duty - that they have 
established a fiduciary relationship with the company due to their 
(43) 
special identity. Under this theory (as shown in Fig. 1), the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship is the precondition for an insider to be 
(44) 
obliged to disclose information when buying or selling securities, and 
only if the insider violates the duty of disclosure in pursuit of his or 
her own benefit can such an act constitute insider trading. 
Fig. 1 
In China, Sub-clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of Article 7 4 of the Securities 
Law list the people who are aware of inside information, but this kind 
of listing does not belong in a "general definition + enumeration + 
miscellaneous provision," pattern in terms of the legislative technology. 
In fact, rather than being relatively open and expansive, the first 6 
Sub-clauses of Article 74 of the Securities Law only enumerate the 
people who mentions as being aware of inside information in Article 
73 of the Securities Law. From the structure of legislative technology, 
Article 74 of the Securities Law does not have the relatively open scope 
represented by "general definition + enumeration + miscellaneous 
provision." On the contrary, its scope becomes relatively more closed 
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scope, narrowing the definition to include the 6 listed situations as 
listed, as well as those identified in accordance with the authorization. 
According to Article 74 of the Securities Law, this provision can be 
easily understood as listing the people who are aware of inside information; 
in other words, Article 74 of the Securities Law includes 7 types of 
persons who are aware of inside information, encompassing both 
traditional and temporary insiders. If "other persons" are not included 
among the 7 types of persons listed in Article 7 4 of the Securities Law, 
regarding them as insiders, the term used by the Securities Law, proves 
difficult. Apart from this, although Sub-clause 7 of Article 74 of the 
Securities Law is considered as a miscellaneous provision, this provision, 
in fact, is an authoritative regulation that authorizes the CSRC to 
regulate any insider who has access to any inside information regarding 
securities trading. This provision extends the definition of "insider," 
but this merely expands the original closed system, rather than serving 
as a manifestation of the relatively open enumeration characterized by 
the "general definition + enumeration+ miscellaneous provision" template. 
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Table 1: Article 74 of the Securities Law 
Article 74 of the Securities Law: The insiders who have access to insider information 
of securities tradinR include: 
Sub-clause (1) 
Sub-clause (2) 
Sub-clause (3) 
Sub-clause (4) 
Sub-clause (5) 
Sub-clause (6) 
Sub-clause (7) 
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f 
posts in their 
com pany to obtain any the com pany 
concerning the issuance and trading of its securities 
The functionaries of the securities regulatory body, and other 
personnel who administer the issuance and trading of securities 
pursuant to their statutory functions and duties 
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n institutions, securities 
exchanges, securities 
registration and clearing institutions, and securities trading service 
organizations; and 
Any other person as prescribed by the securities regulatory authority 
under the State Council. 
General 
Definition 
Enumeration 
Authoritative 
Provision 
The stipulation regarding any insider with access to any inside 
information about securities trading made in the first 6 Sub-clauses of 
Article 74 of the Securities Law uses the traditional fiduciary duty 
theory as the basic theory to define the terms; hence it bears strong 
status standard. Whether or not a person has a fiduciary duty is key 
to determining that person's status as an insider with access to any 
inside information about securities trading. 
Fig. 1 depicts the structure of fiduciary duty. The subjects that 
assume this duty are the director, senior management, controlling 
shareholders, and actual controllers. Those people have shown evident 
identity representation due to their positions, functions and powers or 
(45) 
control factors, and hence they are easily to be confirmed in terms 
of their external forms. It is also an important reason why the 
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identity factors need to take into account when determining the subjects 
of insider trading under the fiduciary duty theory. Article 74 of China's 
Securities Law confirms the definition of insiders as encompassing those 
people who directly bear a fiduciary duty to the company, or alternatively, 
those who inherit a fiduciary duty, as indicated in Sub-clauses 4, 5, 
and 6 of Article 74 of Chinese Securities Law. The persons who bear 
inherited fiduciary duties tend to be closely related to certain special 
occupations, such as intermediary service providers and civil servants 
possessing regulatory power. 
B. Misappropriation Theory
In Dirks v. SEC, the US Supreme Court adopted the fiduciary duty
theory to determine the scope of the definition of a tippee regarding 
disclosed information. The court stated: "a tippee assumes a fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material 
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee 
(46) 
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach." 
The verdict points out that only when a fiduciary relationship exists 
are insiders obligated to disclose information, and only if they have 
(47) 
violated this obligation can their actions constitute insider trading. 
Moreover, "the tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his 
role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary 
(48) 
duty." However, if the insider of company A acquires inside information 
about company B and engages in securities trading with company B, 
under the fiduciary duty theory, said insider is not liable for insider 
Theoretical Adoption and Subject Categorization of 
56 
Insider Trading Regulation in China (李）
trading. Therefore, how to regulate information illegally obtained by 
those who do not have a contractual obligation and the statutory duty 
to establish a fiduciary relationship with the company - purely corporate 
outsiders - has become an increasingly urgent dilemma. The US Supreme 
Court adopted the misappropriation theory in the 1997 case United 
States v. O'Hagan. According to Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, the objects 
of securities fraud does not limit to the trading counterparts, the 
corporate outsiders who acquire influential inside information, though 
does not have fiduciary duty against the trading counterpart, if violate 
the fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence in 
relation to the source of the information, and private acquire inside 
information for their own use, then their behaviors belong to the fraud 
stipulated in Section 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and thus constitute the 
(49) 
insider trading. In this case, the US Supreme Court held that "considering 
the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misappropriated 
information, and the congressional purposes underlying § lO(b), it 
makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O'Hagan a§lO(b) violator if 
he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, 
(50) 
but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder." Therefore, 
we should explicitly acknowledge the effectiveness of the misappropriation 
theory and establish the "misappropriation theory" as the theoretical 
(51) 
basis for identifying such subjects. Fig. 2 (below) depicts the basic 
structure of misappropriation theory. "The 'misappropriation theory' 
holds that a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities 
transaction, and thereby violates Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, when 
he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading 
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(52) 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." 
Fig.2 
In China, Article 7 4 of the Securities Law does not further define 
the person who has illegally acquired any inside information. It was 
just because there is no definition on this, so academically, there are 
"right source theory" and "means theory". According to the former, an 
individual who has a company's inside information but has no right 
to said information possesses it illegally. In other words, subjects who 
have no duties or rights that justify their possession of a listed 
company's inside information but who acquire inside information using 
(53) 
other means are deemed to have illegally acquired said information. 
This theory uses other academic theories to extend the interpretation 
of Article 73 of the Securities Law; in doing so, it exceeds the original 
theoretical basis of the Securities Law. The other theory holds that 
anyone who uses illegal means - including stealing, extracting, or luring-
(54) 
to acquire inside information illegally acquires said informat10n. This 
theory stresses the unlawfulness of the means. In fact, the term "illegal" 
requires an expanded interpretation, and it should not be limited to 
the range of "illegal means" included in the Article 73 of the Securities 
(55) 
Law. As manifested in US laws, the misappropriation theory does not 
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stress illegal means; its essence is the inheritance of the fiduciary 
bearable by the tippees at the lower stream against the information 
transmitter at the upper stream, thus to solve the issue of equal 
(56) 
fiduciary duty bearable by the tippee at the lower stream. 
C. Equal Access Theory
Although the fiduciary duty theory and misappropriation theory can
theoretically account for most insider trading subjects, identifying 
subjects who have no specific official relationships with the company 
but occasionally acquire inside information will prove difficult. In fact, 
the first inside trading-related theory to appear in the US was the 
equal access theory, but its application was restricted because it regulated 
inside trading in an overly broad manner. The United States Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned the "equal access theory" in SEC 
u. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. Case. The Court held that "the only regulatory
objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally, but 
this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts 
so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in 
reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that 
(57) 
of the insiders." This means that, in addition to the directors and 
managers of a company, any persons who have undisclosed information 
that may affect the price of the securities can be called an insider, and 
therefore must follow the "disclose or abstain rule." Thus, if such an 
insider chooses not to disclose the information in question to the public, 
the insider cannot buy or sell securities. Meanwhile, this ruling indicates 
that Rule lOb-5 is based on the justifiable expectation of the securities 
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market place that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have 
(58) 
relatively equal access to material informat10n. Apparently, the equal 
access theory aims to create a fair and honest exchange market. Any 
person, whether a company insider or outsider, who possesses inside 
information can be subject to the insider trading rules. Fig. 3 below 
is the basic structure of this theory. 
Any Person: 
insiders and outsiders 
Fair Interest 
Trade/ Sale 
Fig. 3 
三
After the Cady Roberts Case, the 1969 Texas Gulf Sulphur Case 
increased the US's willingness to crack down on insider trading activities 
using the equal access theory. If we take it literally, the equal access 
theory demands equal opportunity for information acquisition and 
information symmetry among trading counterparts. The basic issue 
that divides them is whether all confidential information relating to 
(59) 
the firm is a corporate asset . The traditional fiduciary duty and 
misappropriation theory were established within the framework of the 
principal-agent relationship. Along with the development of the basic 
theory of corporate governance and the diversification of corporate 
capital, gaming between the interests of multiple parties within companies 
continues to intensify. In this context, all parties expect to acquire 
company information in an equal and timely for the convenience of 
investment. In order to safeguard equal opportunities for investors, 
the theory requires that listed companies' information disclosure divisions 
analyze the proprietary status of inside information, and that the 
Theoretical Adoption and Subject Categorization of 
60 
Insider Trading Regulation in China (李）
inside information disclosure form lists the value of said inside information 
as belonging to the listed company. However, public market factors 
affect such valuations; indeed, regardless of the impact on market 
share prices or on investor selections, this inside information reflects 
the existence of public factors. This means the disclosure of public 
information form should give the market proprietary rights to the 
inside information, thus ensuring that investors can fairly access said 
information. Therefore, in defining insider trading subjects, we should 
not limit our consideration to the "identity factor" under the fiduciary 
duty and "means factor" under the misappropriation theory. Instead, 
we should identify those subjects to regulation based on their awareness 
of inside information, then further judge if the subjects'actions constituted 
insider trading based on whether or not they used insider information 
to buy or sell securities. 
The foregoing analysis shows that Articles 73 and 7 4 of China's 
Securities Law have not adopted the equal access theory; however, the 
many regulations promulgated by the CSRC use the regulative term 
"any person who has access to inside information" to refer to insider 
trading subjects, suggesting a theoretical adoption of the equal access 
theory. 
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IV. SUBJECTS OF INSIDER TRADING: FROM FOCUSING
STATUS TO ACTIVITY RECOGNITION 
A. Anti-Fraud or Market Integrity
Since China's securities market was built relatively recently, China
has learned from the corresponding securities regulations in some 
(60) 
advanced foreign countries or areas, especially the laws of US. Section 
lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 have undergone continuous development as the law 
adopted by the US to prohibit insider trading, creating a normative 
(61) 
system based on the concept of fraud. For example, in Chiarella v. 
United States the Supreme Court stressed that Rule lOb-5 is directed 
(62) 
at fraud. For the most part, the prohibition on insider trading in the 
United States results from administrative and judicial interpretations 
of a broad anti-fraud rule adopted by an administrative agency pursuant 
(63) 
to authority under an even broader statutory provision. A significant 
aim of the exchange act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside 
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate 
office. The two provisions forbid "any person" from engaging in inside 
trading in the United States, and, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
the court ruled that any person could be defined as an inside trading 
subject, not limiting the scope in the corporate officers. However, in 
Chiarella v. United States, the court adopted a definition based on 
whether or not a person had a fiduciary duty to the company, instead 
of applying the equity access theory. The fiduciary duty present obvious 
status factors to subjects of inside trading and just existed in corporate 
insider. The misappropriation theory is "designed to protect the integrity 
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of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders'to a corporation 
who have access to confidential information that will affect the 
corporation's security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary 
(64) 
II or other duty to that corporation's shareholders. In other words, the 
"classical theory" addresses true insider trading (trading by issuers, 
their employees, or persons otherwise affiliated with the issuer), and 
the "misappropriation theory" is broad enough to address outsider 
(65) 
trading (trading by persons who are not affiliated with the issuer). 
At common law, the insider trading prohibition focused on corporate 
(66) 
officers and directors , so that the fiduciary duty theory and the 
misappropriation theory played important roles in the process of defining 
insider trading subjects in the US. Meanwhile, inside information often 
comes from listed companies' corporate materials that may influence 
share prices or investment choices, and the corporate officers may not 
participate in inside trading directly and usually act as tippers, conveying 
the inside information in a complex and secretive manner to facilitate 
inside trading. Accordingly, there is a tippee who receives confidential 
information from tipper, and the tippee could be held liable. "Tippees 
must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they 
receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available 
(67) 
to them improperly," and, in Dirks v. SEC, the court held that, if he 
or she satisfied the following criteria: (1) "the insider's 'tip'constituted 
(68) 
a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty," (2) scienter - the tippees knew 
or had a reason to know about the breach, and (3) the tippees benefitted 
(69) 
from the inside trading. "Absent some personal gain, there has been 
no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, 
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(70) 
there is no derivative breach." The said analysis of the fiduciary duty 
theory and the misappropriation theory reveals that both theories hold 
that the interests of individual investors will be damaged if one uses 
inside information to make a profit. This view not only narrows the 
definition of inside trading subjects, but also places more attention on 
the protection of the interests of individual investors than on the 
(71) 
interests of securities market. In other words, if trading on nonpublic 
information violates Rule lOb-5 only when the trader or his tipper 
has a preexisting fiduciary duty to the other transacting party, so 
that the trader's failure to disclose material facts can be said to defraud 
that other party, many instances of trading on nonpublic information 
(72) 
will fall outside the prohibitions of the rule. 
Nevertheless, the practical cases reveal that the means being adopted 
by the traditional insiders in committing inside trading are more and 
more hidden, and they rarely participate directly in the trading. It is 
apparent that such theories cannot fully encompass the diversity of 
insider trading subjects. By contrast, the European Union's insider 
dealing-related legislation relies on the market theory and prohibits 
"any person" from engaging in inside dealing; this theory also focuses 
on maintaining market integrity, which is similar to the equal access 
theory. Rather than fraud, insider trading is essentially unfair trading 
behavior with uninformed investor by insider using inside information 
acquired from unfair opportunities, and these uninformed investors 
participate in the securities market based on the belief of the fairness 
(73) 
and integrity of the market. In fact, the European Union has changed 
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its approach to the regulation of inside trading, a change that can be 
observed in two representative European Union legislative directives­
Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations 
on insider dealing (the Council Directive 89/592/EEC) and Directive 2003 
/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (the Directive 2003/6 
/EC). Although Article 2 of the former adopted the "any person" 
definition insider trading subjects, it qualified this definition with the 
following expressions "the administrative, management or supervisory 
bodies of the issuer" and "his holding in the capital of the issuer" and 
(74) 
"the exercise of his employment, profession or duties." In other words, 
the Council Directive 89/592/EEC insisted on the recognition of the 
fiduciary duty or misappropriation theory. However, in the Directive 
2003/6/EC, the EU adopted the market theory or the equal access 
theory. This legislation explicitly stated: "'person'shall mean any natural 
(75) 
or legal person " and prohibited any person "who possesses inside 
(76) 
information from using that information" to engage in insider dealing. 
This change indicates that the EU rescinded its initial definition of 
inside trading subjects and adopted the equal access theory. Meanwhile, 
this change also has guiding significance for the EU countries. With 
regard to the orientation of the reform of legislative system relating 
to insider trading, at present, it is not yet proper to introduce fiduciary 
approach in China, whereas market approach may be more suitable to 
(77) 
our legal tradition and the reality of capital market at home. 
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B. Theoretical Adoption to Subject of Insider Trading in China
As preceding analysis indicated, Chinese regulations contain inconsistencies
that produce some confusion regarding the definition of insider trading 
subjects in China. In the Securities law, a person may know confidential 
information, but he or she can be neither "the person who is aware of 
the inside information" nor "the person who illegally acquires inside 
information." The situation of Li in the case of People v. Li and Other 
Persons exemplifies this dilemma. In addition, listed Chinese companies 
typically have a party secretary. A primary cause of this confusion is 
the lack of an explicit theory to guiding Chinese regulations. Nevertheless, 
we cannot find corresponding basis in the existing laws regarding how 
to identify such people. This has created a judicial puzzle. In addition, 
the reasons for the CSRC's selective enforcement is suffering serious 
(78) 
logic problems in respect of the provisions on insider trading. To address 
the existing regulatory and practical problems discussed earlier, this 
paper suggests the adoption of the equal access theory to amend 
Articles 73 and 74 of the Securities Law. Insisting on the market 
integrity idea and reconstituting anti-insider trading legal system may 
be the due choice of enhancing core competitiveness of China's securities 
(79) 
market and achieving logical consistency and institutional completeness. 
China should adopt this theory to define insider trading subjects in the 
securities market for several reasons. First, the fiduciary duty theory, 
as the traditional basis for the regulation of insider trading, only 
identifies directors, supervisors, and senior executives as insider trading 
subjects, mainly on the basis of their fiduciary duty to the company 
and shareholders; this makes it hard to use this theory to explain 
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insider trading that involves company outsiders. It is even difficult for 
the misappropriation theory to address the issue of determining the 
liabilities of confidential information transmitters. Examples include 
when someone accidentally learns inside information when he or she 
is delivering meals to directors and senior executives and then buys 
or sells securities based on overheard information, or when a person 
who bears a fiduciary duty to the company discusses a company project 
(80) 
and is accidentally overheard by his or her family members. Second, 
the paperless securities have been realized at present, the securities 
trading has developed from the traditional over the counter trading to 
trading in the form of public and centralized competitive bidding. 
Transactions are not conducted face-to-face and they cause damage to 
the entire securities market rather than to single investors. Securities 
trading no longer requires the trading parties to disclose information 
to each other; the law requires information disclosure to the issuer or 
the listed company. In the end, in terms of the status of the regulations 
on insider trading subjects in China, as pointed out in the foregoing 
paragraph, the logic of the enumeration in Articles 73 and 7 4 of the 
Securities Law of China is easily misunderstood, making it easy to 
regard the definition of insider trading subjects as the standard definition, 
and the miscellaneous provisions are also easily to expand due to the 
inertia brought by identity factor. However, apparently this understanding 
does not conform to the facts and will likely produce arbitrary 
interpretations regarding the definition of insider trading subjects. 
Moreover, the subjects of insider trading have become increasingly 
diverse and the process has become increasingly technical, hidden, andc 
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(81) 
omplicated (i.e. Huang Guangyu Case, Guangda 8-16 Securities Insider 
(82) 
Trading Case, etc.), causing serious damages to society. The regulation 
of securities insider trading is so serious that the traditional fiduciary 
duty theory and misappropriation theory are no longer adequate as 
the standards for defining the scope of insider trading subjects. In 
conclusion, the adoption of equal access theory no longer merely concerns 
whether or not subjects bear a fiduciary duty. Instead, it tests whether 
subjects clearly know that the information concerned is inside information 
and still make illegal use of said information. In this way, it generates 
stronger punishments for unlawful acts and protects the interests of 
investors, making it the best way to address the abovementioned 
problems. 
However, some people may worry that the application of the equal 
access theory will create a regulatory system that covers too broad a 
range of potential insider trading subjects. So, how can we achieve 
balance between maintaining good faith in the market and avoiding 
an overly broad definition? Stipulating the exceptions (exemption or 
waiver clause) also proves quite difficult. It is easy to envision a situation 
in which a too narrow scope of exceptions may would fail to account 
for many legitimately exceptional cases; meanwhile a too broad scope 
of exceptions could undercut our original intention of adopting the 
equal access theory. However, this worry may not be necessary because 
the supervision of securities insider trading in China is dominated by 
administrative regulations. Trading regulation involves a multi-level 
legal system that includes criminal punishment, relevant established 
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administrative punishment, and civil liability. Not all the insider trading 
cases become criminal proceedings, so worrying about the possibility 
of being punished severely for accidentally acquiring inside information 
is unnecessary. As for determining whether or not we should impose 
punishment in cases where individuals accidentally learn or overhear 
inside information (i.e. a person overhears a discussion about major 
undisclosed company news while sunbathing, walking, or eating a meal), 
we should adopt the equal access theory in judging on whether or not 
said person has engaged in insider trading and whether or not he or 
she should be punished accordingly. Guided by market approach, any 
improper use of inside information should be decided as insider trading, 
the constitutive elements concerning subject and subjectivity that 
constitute insider trading as provided by the law in force should be 
(83) 
abolished. The key lies in determining whether the person clearly knows 
that the information is inside information and still makes improper 
(84) 
use of it to make a profit, which requires the existence of an intentional, 
knowing fraud that damages information equality in the securities 
market, as well as the rights and interests of other investors. 
V. DIFFERENT STANDARDS TO CONFIRMING THE SUB
JECTS OF INSIDE TRADING 
A. Categorization of Subjects of Insider Trading
Although more attention should be paid to whether subjects use inside
information to trade securities according to the equal access theory, 
we still care about the identity of subjects after defining the people 
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who have taken part in insider trading, and we still need to categorize 
the subjects of securities insider trading. This categorization should be 
(85) 
mainly based on the following reasons . First, most insider trading 
cases are closely related to company insiders, which requires that law 
on insider trading first focus on those subjects, strictly enforce the 
information disclosure obligation, and to do a good job in preventing 
premature information disclosure. The real feature of informed staff 
(86) 
is securities insider information available to them based on Job. Second, 
the identity characteristics of insider trading subjects, as a supportive 
basis to prove their knowledge of insider information, has important 
practical value, because identifying whether a concerned party knows 
inside information has always been a difficult issue in judicial practice. 
Defining the identity characteristics of insider trading subjects in 
relation to awareness of inside information may help solve this problem. 
Therefore, China still needs to uphold the categorization of insider 
trading subjects. 
Regarding the standard for identifying insiders, China mainly stresses 
the specific identities or their specific relationships with the company. 
However, an inside information in the securities market is no longer 
limited to information from within companies, and insiders are also 
no longer limited to insiders within the company. Therefore, the 
categorization of insider trading subjects should focus on the essence 
of insider trading - "whether or not the insider bears a certain identity 
within the company or has a certain relationship with the company" 
is less important than "whether or not the insider makes use of the 
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inside information to engage in insider trading to make profit." On the 
basis of the identity under which one acquires inside information, we 
can divide the insider trading subjects into three categories: corporate 
(87) 
insiders, temporary insiders, and tippees. Corporate insiders refer to 
persons in charge of the company (directors, supervisors and senior 
executives) or those who have direct or significant obligations to the 
company due to employment, occupation, or execution of duties (those 
traditional insiders) - the persons that are prescribed in Sub-clauses 1-
4 of Article 74 of China's Securities Law. Temporary insiders refer to 
people outside the company who have the right to or access to inside 
information due to work relations, including banks, securities dealers, 
appointed accountants, or lawyers that have business relation with the 
company, as well as public servants - for example, government 
management staff who know inside information due to their statutory 
(88) 
duties (Sub-clause 5-6 of Article 74 of the Securities Law). The tippee 
(89) 
category is relatively broad, mcluding not only those who acquire inside 
information through illegal means, but also those who receive said 
information from company insiders or insiders working as government 
management officials, directly or indirectly - for example, the spouses, 
minor children, other relatives, or those who maintain the information 
under the names of others person. 
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Table 2: Categorization of Subjects oflnsider Trading 
Categorized Subjects 
Type 1: Corporate insiders 
Type 2: Temporary insiders 
Classic Examples 
directors, supervisors, semor executives, actual 
controllor, major shareholder 
intermediary service provider(accountants, 
lawyers, etc.), civil servants 
positive tippees and passive tippees 
This categorization's significance stems from the fact that it draws 
on the regulations of foreign countries but is compliant with the 
stipulations of China's Securities Law, since it focuses on equal access 
to market information. Meanwhile, in the process of judicial adjudication, 
using these three different categories of subjects may help judges 
determine their respective duties of care and the corresponding extent 
of subjective illegality. We do not regard subjective fault as the key 
element when holding company insiders liable; however, when holding 
temporary insiders and tippees liable, we should consider the subjective 
criteria such as intentionality and clear awareness. Doing so will not 
only provide actors who comply with conditions reasonable causes for 
their defense, but also prevent the creation of too broad a scope of 
regulation; this also strengthens supervision over insider trading and 
protects the right of investors to have equal access to information. 
B. Different Confirmation to the Subjects
In general, a close relationship exists between insider information
and corporate insiders, because, through their actions and discussions, 
corporate insiders create insider information. Meanwhile, the other 
insider trading subjects often engage in insider trading via mediums 
(90) 
that convey inside information from traditional insiders to them. Such 
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people maybe possess positive or passive attitudes toward the acquisition 
of inside information. Therefore, to achieve the goal of protecting the 
fair and honest market, it is necessary to distinguish between these 
different attitudes. 
1 . Corporate Insiders: Standard of Identity and Slightly Tallying the 
Trading 
Articles 73 and 74 of the Securities Law adopted the traditional 
fiduciary duty and focused on insider trading subject identity. However, 
following the equal access theory, it should pay more attention to 
whether insider trading subjects know insider information rather than 
focusing on their identities. Therefore, the key factor in defining insider 
trading subjects proving that the individuals in question know inside 
information. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the identity factor of 
traditional insiders. The fiduciary duty theory, the misappropriation 
theory, and the equal access theory all treat corporate insiders as 
insider trading subjects who should be regulated. From a practical 
perspective, these corporate insiders also comprise the majority of insider 
trading subjects. An analysis of China's 134 insider trading cases reveals 
that corporate insiders (directors, supervisors, and senior managers) 
commit the most insider trading violations, constituting 55.27% of all 
(91) 
insider·trading subjects. In addition, the insider trading cases usually 
occur during companies'assets reorganizations and confidential information 
tends to concern the enterprises' mergers and acquisitions in China -
often divulged from corporate insiders to outsiders. Consequently, we 
should continue to examine identity and should treat identity as an 
important factor in determining whether or not subjects recognize 
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inside information when we define the scope of insider trading subjects. 
Therefore, if a case satisfies three elements-existence of inside information, 
identity of subject relating to inside case and trading which the subject 
has engaged in the transaction in a sensitive period to price, we can 
presume that the subject has engaged in insider trading and, by law, 
the subject should be prosecuted. However, those three elements just 
to be presumed to satisfy insider trading. In other words, there are 
some situations to eliminate illegality for the subject. For example, 
someone planned to conduct a trade in the securities market before 
acquiring an inside information; however, it is important to note that 
subjects bear the burden of proof in such situations. 
2. Temporary Insiders: Medium Factor and Moderately Tallying the
Trading 
The identify factor also needs to be weighed regarding temporary 
insiders. Temporary insiders often include individuals with intermediary 
identities like lawyers, accountants, and civil servants who have power 
to access information about policies, economic tendencies, and dates 
(92) 
that could affect stock pnces. Essentially, these identities can help 
temporary insiders access inside information via special vehicles like 
intermediaries. Therefore, temporary insiders become aware of inside 
information via their identities to some degree. This makes it legally 
or contractually incumbent upon them to keep inside information secret 
and not to convey inside information outside to engage in securities 
trading. Out of the 134 analyzed cases, those involving temporary 
(93) 
insiders accounted for 10.97%. Consequently, if a case satisfies three 
elements - the existence of inside information, the existence of a 
Theoretical Adoption and Subject Categorization of 
74 Insider Trading Regulation in China (李）
medium factor, and trading that a subject engaged in during a price­
sensitive period - we can presume the subject engaged in insider trading. 
Meanwhile, as with traditional insiders, those elements just presume 
to satisfy insider trading and there are some situations to eliminate 
(94) 
illegality for the subject. 
3. Tippees: Conveying and Substantially Tallying the Trading
An analysis of 134 insider trading cases reveals that cases involving 
(95) 
tippees account for 33. 76% of all cases, and, in these cases, outsiders 
make use of inside information to engage in insider trading; the inside 
information is thus disseminated through hidden acts and complex 
chains. Meanwhile, with the intensified regulation of insider trading, 
cases involving traditional insiders and temporary insiders directly 
engaging in insider trading decrease and the cases involving tippees 
participate in insider trading via conveying inside information increase. 
(96) 
The tippees can be divided clearly into two categories. 
One category is positive tippees. It is quite common for the close 
relatives of corporate insiders or temporary insiders to engage in insider 
trading in the process of positively conveying inside information. In 
general, both corporate insiders and temporary insiders recognize the 
risk of insider trading. However, lured by the lust for money, they 
intentionally leak inside information to people, often their relatives, to 
facilitate insider trading. Therefore, there need a prerequisite that 
someone who know inside information and convey inside information 
to the close relative to engage in insider trading. It is convenient and 
private for such individuals to convey inside information in pursuit of 
their own economic interests. Proving the existence of mutual intent 
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in insider trading would be very difficult. Consequently, the CSRC 
must prove the existence of inside information and that a subject with 
knowledge of said inside information had a relationship with the subject 
who directly participated in insider trading (such as close relative, friends, 
etc.) to prove that insider trading took place. 
The other category is passive tippees. Subjects in this category often 
accidentally receive inside information, rather than engaging maliciously 
in collusion and intentionally acquiring the information. The reason 
some scholars refuse to regard the equal access theory as a legal basis 
for insider trading regulation is that the theory requires the regulation 
of a larger range of subjects, particularly passive tippees. However, 
adopting the theory and regarding passive tip pees as insider trading 
subjects would not ultimately extend this designation to innocents. 
Although the passive tippees would be regulated by law, they would 
be just one type of insider trading subject and this would not mean, 
by default, that they engaged in insider trading. If they get inside 
information accidently and use the information to make a transaction 
intentionally, they could be charged with insider trading, because they 
would have infringed the fair interests of the market under the equal 
access theory. Therefore, if CSRC can prove that passive tippees engage 
in trading intentionally, they can be charged with insider trading. 
Meanwhile, the situation just is to be presumed and could be overturned 
if there have reasons to eliminate illegality. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The foregoing analysis shows that China should adopt the equal 
access theory's definition of insider trading subjects so that the 
identification of subjects will exclusively depend on whether they illegally 
use the insider information they possess instead of being confined to 
whether or not they bear fiduciary duties to the companies in question. 
If the Securities Law in China continues to rely on the fiduciary duty 
theory to define insider trading subjects, securities market regulators 
will find it hard to meet the current demands of the securities market. 
Adopting the equal access theory as the theoretical basis for identifying 
insider trading subjects will enable us to use the term "any person" 
quoted in the Securities Law, Criminal Law, other laws and regulations, 
departmental regulations and judicial interpretations to identify said 
subjects. This will unify the terms used in upper- and lower-level 
legislation and eliminate the semantic logic contradictions in Article 
73 of the Securities Law. Within the scope of subjects for insider trading, 
by adoption of the term "any person", for as long as the person knowing 
insider information has engaged in securities trading during the sensitive 
period, he or she shall comply with the subject condition for insider 
trading, needless to regard such person bears the fiduciary duty (identity 
factor) as the considerations for subject identification. Meanwhile, this 
expression also indicates that all actors who conduct securities trading 
during the sensitive period commit insider trading acts and therefore 
must be regulated. Legal regulations are never in absolute terms and 
exceptional circumstances should also be prescribed. 
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In line with current amendments to the Securities Law, we suggest 
the elimination of the phrase "any person who illegally acquires inside 
information" from the sentence, "any insider involved in securities trading 
and any person who illegally acquires inside information are prohibited 
from using inside information to engage in securities trading activities." 
The revised sentence should read: "any person involved in securities 
trading is prohibited from illegally using inside information to engage 
in securities trading activities." Meanwhile, although Article 74 can 
categorically enumerate the insider trading subjects, it does not need 
to list all of them at once. A defect of the categorized listing is that 
it is impossible to list all potential subjects. Therefore, the miscellaneous 
provision of the law should use the phrase "any person who acquires 
inside information via any other means." 
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